We argue that the incomplete information which the government has about domestic agents means that tariffs become an optimal instrument to protect them from import competition. We solve for the optimal government policies. subject to the political constraint of ensuring Pareto gains from trade,...

In this survey I analyze different approaches for protecting the environment when stakeholders are privately informed about the costs and benefits of pollution reduction. The presence of asymmetric information calls for some important departures from the textbook prescriptions of marketable...

This paper examines breakup fees and stock lockups as devices for prospective target firms to encourage bidder participation in takeover contest. We show that, unless bidding costs for the first bidder are too high, breakup fees provide for the socially desirable degree of competition and ensure...

From experience, regulated monopolists learn to employ cost-reducing innovations. We characterize the optimal regulation of an innovating monopolist with unknown costs. Regulatory policy is designed to minimize current costs of service while encouraging development of cost-saving innovations. We...

We construct a simple model of the regulatory process in which a monopoly firm has private information about its capabilities and its cost-reducing activities. The optimal regulatory policy offers the firm a choice between two regulatory regimes, one of which resembles price-cap regulation. The...