The behavior of a hedge-fund manager naturally depends on her compensation scheme, her preferences, and constraints on her risk-taking. We propose a numerical method which can be used to analyze the impact of these influences. The model leads to several interesting and novel results concerning...

Numerous hedge funds stop reporting to commercial databases each year. An issue for hedgefund performance estimation is: what delisting return to attribute to such funds? This would be particularly problematic if delisting returns are typically very different from continuing funds' returns. In...

This paper investigates dynamically optimal risk-taking by an expected-utility maximizing manager of a hedge fund. We examine the effects of variations on a compensation structure that includes a percentage management fee, a performance incentive for exceeding a specified highwater mark, and...

We model a firm's value process controlled by a manager maximizing expected utility from restricted shares and employee stock options. The manager also dynamically controls allocation of his outside wealth. We explore interactions between those controls as he partially hedges his exposure to...

Previous papers have argued that trading restrictions can result in a typical employee stock option having a subjective value (certainty equivalent value) that is substantially less than its Black-Scholes value. However, these analyses ignore the manager's ability to (at least partially) control...

We investigate incentive effects of a typical hedge-fund contract for a manager with power utility. With a one-year horizon, she displays risk-taking that varies ramatically with fund value. We extend the model to multiple yearly evaluation periods and find her risk-taking is rapidly moderated...