We build a simple positive theory of privatisation for countries where governments have private agendas. Privatisation occurs when the rulers of the country can fetch enough shares in the newly created firms to compensate them from the private benefits they were deriving from public firms. The...

After discussing examples of enforcement failures for regulatory contracts in Africa, we develop a regulation model with asymmetric information and imperfect enforcement. Either the regulator succeeds in forcing the regulated firm to fulfill the contract or renegotiation takes place. The...

This paper develops a normative model of regulatory policy toward bypass and cream skimming. It analyzes the effects of bypass on second-degree price discrimination, on the rent of the regulated firm, and on the welfare of low-demand customers. It shows that pricing under marginal cost may be...

The objectif of this paper is to give a microeconomic foundation to misleading advertising in order to derive a method to evaluate its social costs both in terms of efficiency and in terms of distribution. We develop first the approach leading to the concept of demand based on information biased...