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Communication and information sharing in teams

Rothenberg, Naomi R. - In: The accounting review : a publication of the American … 90 (2015) 2, pp. 761-784

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010517077

Three essays on irrational beliefs

Danz, David - 2014

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010357442

Delegation of information verification

Kim, Doyoung - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 488-500

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010247653

Verifiable and nonverifiable information in a two-period agency problem

Budde, Jörg - 2013

I examine how a firm's opportunity to verify information influences the joint use of verifiable and unverifiable information for incentive contracting. I employ a simple two-period agency model, in which contract frictions arise from limited liability and the potential unverifiability of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010200420

Optimal information revelation by informed investors

Strausz, Roland - 2005

This paper studies the structure of optimal finance contracts in an agency model of outside finance, when investors possess private information. We show that, depending on the intensity of the entrepreneur's moral hazard problem, optimal contracts induce full, partial, or no revelation of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366545

The overconfident trader does not always overreact to his information

Du, Sarina; Liu, Hong - In: Economic modelling 46 (2015), pp. 384-390

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011436667

Implementing the "wisdom of the crowd"

Kremer, Ilan; Mansour, Yishay; Perry, Motty - In: Journal of political economy 122 (2014) 5, pp. 988-1012

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010470994

Information, risk sharing and incentives in agency problems

Xie, Jia - 2015

This paper studies the use of information for incentives and risk sharing in agency problems. When the principal is risk neutral or the outcome is contractible, risk sharing is unnecessary or completely taken care of by a contract on the outcome. In this case, information systems are ranked...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010477080

Die Principal-Agent-Theorie aus informationsökonomischer Sicht

Kiener, Stefan - 1990

Im Rahmen der Institutionellen Mikroökonomie hat die Agency-Theorie in jüngster Zeit einen hohen Stellenwert erlangt …. Die normative, auch als Principal-Agent-Theorie bezeichnete Ausrichtung, die Gegenstand dieses Buches ist, hat sich das … Literaturvorschlägen zur Optimierung von Delegationsbeziehungen im Rahmen der Principal-Agent-Theorie anhand eines Klassifikationsschemas …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010428620

Nonlinear pricing with finite information

Bergemann, Dirk; Shen, Ji; Xu, Yun; Yeh, Edmund M. - 2015

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010486995