We analyze oligopolistic third-degree price discrimination relative to uniform pricing when markets are always covered. Pricing equilibria are critically determined by supply-side features such as the number of firms and their marginal cost differences. It follows that each firm's Lerner index...

This paper analyzes price discrimination of an upstream cartel in the presence of a dominant firm at the retail level. Charging different wholesale prices creates a bond between the upstream cartel and the favored downstream firm. This bond reduces or eliminates this firm's incentives to accept...

We analyze the competitive effects of backward vertical integration when firms exert market power upstream and compete à la Cournot downstream. Contrasting with previous literature, a small degree of vertical integration is always procompetitive because efficiency gains dominate foreclosure...

We analyze the effects of strategic behavior and private information in pollution permit markets in which all firms have market power. The market is characterized by supply-function equilibria. Firms submit net supplies for permits and a market maker selects the market-clearing price. Net...