The Hong Kong Stock Exchange (HKEx) adopted a closing call auction in 2008 but suspended its operation ten months later due to suspicion of widespread price manipulation. The Exchange relaunched the auction in 2016 with manipulation-deterrence enhancements. We exploit this unique setting by...

I offer a competitive explanation for the rush toward early contracting in matching markets. The explanation does not rely on market power, strategic motives, or instability of the assignment mechanism. Uncertainty about workers' ability will produce inefficient matching if contracts are formed...

Using ordinary calculus techniques, we investigate the conditions under which LeChatelier effects are signable for finite changes in parameter values. We show, for example, that the short run demand for a factor is always less responsive to price changes than the long run demand, provided that...

In an assignment market with uncertainty regarding productive ability of participants, early contracting can occur as participants balance risk sharing and sorting efficiency. More promising agents may contract early with each other because insurance gains outweigh sorting inefficiency, whereas...