When a symbol is desecrated, the desecrator obtains benefits while other people incur costs. Negative externalities are intrinsic to desecration, suggesting a case for government regulation if the costs exceed the benefits. The case for restrictions is especially strong because of the...

The possibility of buying out an entrant has an import ant effect on entry deterrence. Entrants can blackmail the incumbent by threatening to keep prices low, and buyout can make entry profitab le which otherwise would not be. In particular, the entry-deterrence policy of excess capacity to...

Consider a Bertrand model in which each firm may be inactive with aknown probability, so the number of active firms is uncertain. Thissimple model has a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which industryprofits are positive and decline with the number of firms, the samefeatures which make the Cournot...

This paper offers a multisecurity model in which prices reflect both covariance risk and misperceptions of firms' prospects, and in which arbitrageurs trade to profit from mispricing. We derive a pricing relationship in which expected returns are linearly related to both risk and mispricing...