[enter Abstract Body]We use a sample of randomly selected CRSP-listed firms to explore the cross-sectional determinants of corporate board size. We find that the average number of directors on boards differs significantly across industries. Further evidence indicates that these differences are...

Takeover defense mechanisms have become common for many modern corporations. In this research, we examine one potential takeover defense mechanism, golden parachutes. In particular, the relationship between the board of directors and the board committees and the question of whether the...

This paper studies a sample of firms that changed their auditors and examines the potential agency cost issues that may arise. We find that on average the stock market interprets auditor changes as an agency cost because the changes seem to be management entrenching events. We also document that...

We test whether the conversion price (ratio) is viewed by the stock market as a credible signal of the firm's future earnings prospects (Kim, 1990) and subsequently whether convertible debt serves as backdoor equity financing (Stein, 1992). Examining the conversion price in relation to current...

This study examines the performance of filter and dual moving-average crossover trading rules applied to Nasdaq stocks. We find that trading rules conditioned on a stock?s past price history perform poorly, but those based on past movements in the overall Nasdaq Index tend to earn statistically...

We find that the most common board size for US publicly-traded firms ranges from eight to eleven directors. Over time, small boards (seven or fewer directors), tend to increase their size, but large boards (12 or more directors), tend to shrink their size. This result suggests a significant mean...

By examining only firms that experience net losses and negative cash flows, we are able to analyze a sample of firms that face a discrete refinancing point with no internal equity available, as well as a liquidity mismatch between assets and liabilities. These unique characteristics of our...

We examine the effects of busy directors on merger premiums and conclude that busy directors are not uniformly detrimental. We provide evidence that busy CEOs of acquirer firms are associated with lower premiums suggesting they do not shirk their responsibilities. Busy CEOs of target firms...

Previous studies show that co-managers mainly affect IPO aftermarket activities. We investigate the role of co-managers in IPO premarket activities. We argue that co-managers help reduce IPO placement risk and hypothesize that IPO issuers hire more co-managers when placement risk is higher. We...

Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the...