Impression and earnings management were explored via reasoning and methods grounded in ethnostatistics and agency theory. We hypothesized that earnings management occurs more frequently following duality-creating successions than otherwise because CEO-chairs have greater control of the...

This paper investigates stock returns surrounding the appointment of directors to audit committees. We examine 136 voluntary appointment announcements over 1990-2001. Most of the announcements are issued after year 1999 and by small, NASDAQ firms. We find significantly positive stock price...

We examine the board structure of firms following stock-for-stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre-merger target board. The relative size of...

We examine the role of the board of directors, the audit committee, and the executive committee in preventing earnings management. Supporting an SEC Panel Report's conclusion that audit committee members need financial sophistication, we show that the composition of a board in general and of an...

Managing the succession process by the hiring and firing of key executives is one of the important functions of a board of directors. In this research we study successions of fund managers in the closed-end mutual fund industry. The agency issues inherent in closed-end mutual funds makes them a...

Grounded in agency theory, this study investigates how the strength of shareholder rights influences the extent of firm diversification and the excess value attributable to diversification. The empirical evidence reveals that the strength of shareholder rights is inversely related to the...