This paper examines a recent debate in the literature on power indices in which classical measures such as the Banzhaf, Shapley-Shubik, and Public Good indices have been criticized on the grounds that they do not take into account player preferences. It has been argued that an index that is...

This paper discusses the thesis that in Arrow’s Possibility Theorem the dictator (merely) serves as a solution to the logical problem of aggregating preference while Machiavelli’s dictator, the Prince, has the historical function to bring order into a world of chaos and thus make society...

This paper uses the concept of power to analyze Machiavelli's The Prince and the Discourses on the First Ten Books of Titus Livius. This helps to distil the elements that form the Machiavelli program that has its short-term aim in the formation of a national state of Italy. A unification of...

This paper wants to be both: an introduction to game-theoretical thinking as well as a game-theoretical discussion of Schiller’s Wallenstein. Note that the intention of this article is to convince theatergoers and people who work in the theatrical arts that it is worthwhile to study some game...

The message of this paper is that value of a coalition is power. This coincides with the view that coalitions do not have preferences, but merely represent the preferences of their members. Implications are discussed with the respect to (a) the hypothesis that power indices cannot explain...

The paper presents an overview of issues related to standardization in the European transportation market. The paper identifies current trends in the European transportation policy: deregulation in service markets, horizontal integration of infrastructures/networks, and vertical disintegration...