. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify firms that suffer from a misalignment of managers and shareholders …' interests; (2) CEOs' pay-for-performance sensitivity increases in the post-proposal period; and (3) shareholders benefit through … performance (NPSPs). Collectively, our results indicate that shareholders benefit from this pay-performance activism through PSPs …

This paper studies how hedge fund activism reshapes board monitoring, CEO incentives and compensation. I find that … activists target CEOs who have co-opted the board, have poor performance records and weak equity portfolio incentives, are less … oust underperforming CEOs, strengthen CEO incentives, and increase the use of RPE. CEO pay levels rise following activism …

(CEO) relative inside leverage to proxy for the incentives of risk-averse managers, we find that CEOs with higher inside …We provide evidence concerning the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on merger and acquisition (M … leverage are more likely to engage in vertical mergers, and those mergers generate lower announcement returns for shareholders …