We investigate the collective decision problem with incomplete information and side payments. We show that for generic prior distributions, there exists a direct mechanism associated with the social choice function that satisfies budget balancing, incentive compatibility, and interim individual...

This paper investigates the implementation problem of a social choice function in the complete information environments. We investigate a partial revelation mechanism, in which, each player announces only opinions about her own and two neighbors' utility indices. We require that for every...

We investigate infinitely repeated games with imperfect private monitoring. We focus on a class of games where the payoff functions are additively separable and the signal for monitoring a player's action does not depend on the other player's action. Tit-for-tat strategies function very well in...

This paper presents a theoretical foundation of the possibility that multimarket contact enhances firms' abilities to sustain implicit collusion. When firms operate in a single market and cannot perfectly monitor the opponents' choices of supply, it is impossible to achieve efficiency among...

This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games, where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is imperfect and private, and players' private signal structures satisfy the conditional independence. We require almost no conditions concerning...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map states to lotteries, where agents have preferences not only for consequences but also for 'honesty'. We show that in the complete information environments with three or more agents, every social choice function is implementable in...

We investigate implementation of social choice functions that map from states to lotteries and may depend on factors other than agents' preferences. We assume that agents are not only purely self-interested but also honesty-oriented in a lexicographical way. We define iterative honesty-proofness...

This paper investigates infinitely repeated prisoner-dilemma games where the discount factor is less than but close to 1. We assume that monitoring is truly imperfect and truly private, there exist no public signals and no public randomization devices, and players cannot communicate and use only...

We model a timing game of bubbles and crashes a la Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), in which arbitrageurs compete with each other to beat the gun in a stock market. However, unlike Abreu and Brunnermeier, instead of assuming sequential awareness, the present paper assumes that with a small...

This paper investigates the situation of strategic conflict in which players have limited prior knowledge about the objective game, that is, they do not know their true, objective payoff functions, and therefore, have to formulate their own payoff functions based on their past experiences in a...