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Corporate takeovers, firm performance, and board composition

Kini, Omesh - In: The journal of corporate finance : contracting, … 1 (1995) 3, pp. 383-412

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001185602

Determinants of the execution costs of common stock trades by individual investors

Blum, Gerald A. - In: The journal of financial research 9 (1986) 4, pp. 291-301

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001042750

Applying lessons from housing to meeting the challenge of water and sanitation for the urban poor

Campbell, Tim S. - 1987

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Money and capital markets

Campbell, Tim S. - 1988

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On the optimal regulation of financial guarantees

Campbell, Tim S. - In: The journal of real estate finance and economics 1 (1988) 1, pp. 61-74

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001158216

Optimal speculation in the presence of costly external financing

Campbell, Tim S.; Kracaw, William A. - In: Corporate risk : strategies and management, (pp. 131-139). 2005

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003276187

Information production, market signalling, and the theory of financial intermediation

Campbell, Tim S.; Kracaw, William A. - In: The journal of finance : the journal of the American … 35 (1980) 4, pp. 863-882

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001974127

The market for managerial labor services and capital market equilibrium

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Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001974157

Sorting equilibria in financial markets : the incentive problem

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Optimal Managerial Incentive Contracts and the Value of Corporate Insurance

Campbell, Tim S.; Kracaw, William A. - In: Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 22 (1987) 03, pp. 315-328

This paper investigates the impact of managerial hedging on shareholder wealth when managers are able to choose the level of effort they expend in managing firms' investments. We demonstrate that shareholders will prefer managers to hedge observable unsystematic risks because they expect that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005243724