Similar Search Results

Asymmetric information in simple bargaining games : an experimental study

Klempt, Charlotte; Pull, Kerstin; Stadler, Manfred - 2017

Bilateral bargaining situations are often characterized by informational asymmetries concerning the size of what is at stake: in some cases, the proposer is better informed, in others, it is the responder. We analyze the effects of both types of asymmetric information on proposer behavior in two...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011623050

Too smart for their own good! : complexity, capacity and credence in trade negotiations

Kerr, William A. - In: The Estey Centre journal of international law and trade … 8 (2007) 2, pp. 124-137

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009564018

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; journal of the Econometric … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011392702

Incomplete information about social preferences explains equal division and delay in bargaining

Kohler, Stefan - In: Games 3 (2012) 3, pp. 119-137

Two deviations of alternating-offer bargaining behavior from economic theory are observed together, yet have been …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009754119

Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

This paper characterizes equilibrium outcomes of extensive form games with incomplete information in which players can sign renegotiable contracts with third-parties. Our aim is to understand the extent to which third-party contracts can be used as commitment devices when it is impossible to...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

One-sided uncertainty and delay in reputational bargaining

Abreu, Dilip; Pearce, David G.; Stacchetti, Ennio - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 10 (2015) 3, pp. 719-773

A two-person infinite-horizon bargaining model where one of the players may have either of two discount factors, has a multiplicity of perfect Bayesian equilibria. Introducing the slightest possibility that either player may be one of a rich variety of stationary behavioral types singles out a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673276

Chapter 25 Terrorism: A Game-Theoretic Approach

Sandler, Todd; Arce, Daniel G. - In: Handbook of defense economics : volume 2, Defense in a …, (pp. 775-813). 2007

This chapter surveys the past applications of game theory to the study of terrorism. By capturing the strategic … interplay between terrorists and targeted governments, game theory is an appropriate methodology for investigating terrorism and … counterterrorism. Game theory has been used to examine the interaction among targeted governments, the interface between factions …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024404

Reasoning and learning in guessing games and ultimatum games with incomplete information : an experimental investigation

Nagel, Rosemarie - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000893808

Information, strategic behavior and fairness in ultimatum bargaining : an experimental study

Güth, Werner; Damme, Eric E. C. van - 1994

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000896174

Strategic delegation : an experiment

Fershtman, Chaim; Genîzî, Ûrî - 1996

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000956055