Although scholars have studied outside executive succession for decades, there is still no clear definition of the term “outsider”. We focus on a new dimension of outsiderness, the industrial background of executives hired from outside the firm into a CEO position. This paper examines the...

We investigate the impact of regulation on shareholder rights and corporate governance. We gauge the strength of shareholder rights by measuring the number of restrictive governance provisions that suppress shareholder rights - the more restrictive the governance, the weaker the shareholder...

Based on Brickley’s (2003) call for research on the CEO/turnover relation, we examine determinants of CEO age at succession. Utilizing the similarity–attraction paradigm, we propose that board members will select new CEOs that are similar to their own age. We find a strong positive relation...

In this paper we hypothesize that CEOs will be motivated to manage earnings prior to a turnover decision. This motivation comes from the horizon problem for CEOs nearing retirement age and for CEOs whose profit-based bonus is a large portion of their total compensation. We find that firms in...

This paper examines the effects of board composition and ownership structure in the valuation of target firms in cancelled mergers. These results find no significant association between board composition and shareholder wealth. On the contrary, when a merger is cancelled by the target firm,...

Purpose – This study seeks to analyze the differences between merger cancellations and three types of takeover failures: failures that are associated with targeted share repurchases (greenmail), failures in which the sole bidder simply withdraws the offer, and failures that are accompanied by...

We examine the board structure of firms following stock-for-stock mergers. We find that former target inside (outside) directors are more likely to join the combined firm board when target insiders (outsiders) have a relatively strong position on the pre-merger target board. The relative size of...

We examine the effects of busy directors on merger premiums and conclude that busy directors are not uniformly detrimental. We provide evidence that busy CEOs of acquirer firms are associated with lower premiums suggesting they do not shirk their responsibilities. Busy CEOs of target firms...