Anderson, Goeree and Ramer (1997) observe that although the Uniform consumer density is almost universally assumed in Hotelling style location games, it is more realistic to assume non-uniform distributions. Using Anderson et al.'s (1997) sufficient conditions for the existence of a unique pure...

Location games offer simple and parsimonious frameworks for analyzing a host of issues from political competition to product positioning and business strategy. In this chapter, we review existing approaches to modeling spatial competition using location games and benefits, as well as challenges...

Two players are endowed with resources for setting up N locations on K identical circles, with N K ≥ 1. The players alternately choose these locations (possibly in batches of more than one in each round) in order to secure the area closer to their locations than that of their rival's. They...

This paper extends the interval Hotelling model with quadratic transport costs to the n-player case. For a large set of locations including potential equilibrium configurations, we show for n 2 that firms neither maximize differentiation - as in the duopoly model - nor minimize differentiation...