Much of what may be coined the creeping degradation of the environment is due to economic projects which are subject to public approval. The erection of buildings, the siting of factories, all require permission from bureaucracies. To answer the question whether there is too much or not enough...

In diesem Beitrag soll aufgezeigt werden, inwiefern die DNS als Finanzierungs- und Umweltschutzinstrument zur Lösung globaler Umweltprobleme und der Schuldenkrise der Dritten Welt und, wie unlängst auch vorgeschlagen (vgl. Schreiber (1988)), in Osteuropa beitragen können. Im nachfolgenden...

Does international tax competition in the environmental field lead to undesirably low levels of environmental regulation and to unacceptable disruptions of environmental quality? The paper tries to answer this question in a non-competitive partial-equilibrium framework. There is one firm that...

In diesem Papier werden Ansatzpunkte zur Regulierung von Stromunternehmen auf ihre Effizienzeigenschaften untersucht. Zu diesem Zweck wird zunächst als analytischer Ausgangspunkt das institutionenökonomische Konzept des Regulierungsvertrags dargestellt und im Anschluß die...

This paper provides a rationale for taxing waste exports when closure risks are endogenous in that they depend on the importing country's accumulated stock of waste. The paper shows that the optimal time path of waste exports requires a progressively increasing tax rate which even surmounts a...

This paper presents an alternative view on the appropriateness of international policy coordination. Policy-makers compete for internationally mobile capital by offering club goods which are used as input factors by firms. A country is attractive for internationally mobile capital if the price...

In a recent paper, Muthoo (1995) discusses whether the Rubinstein solution carries over on repeated bargaining situations. He concludes that stationary equilibria for such a repeated bargaining game do not imply the Rubinstein solution and that several non-stationary equilibria may exist. This...