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Lump-Sum Quota Bonuses and Other Vertical Restraints with Cournot Retailers

Tung, Chris Y. - 2013

Lump-sum quota bonuses are a specific type of quota bonus that provides a lump-sum transfer from a manufacturer to a retailer when the retailer's sales exceed a pre- determined quota. This paper explores whether lump-sum quota bonuses and two other vertical restraints, two-part tariffs and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013090149

The collusive efficacy of competition clauses in Bertrand Markets with capacity-constrained retailers

Trost, Michael - 2021

We study the collusive efficacy of competition clauses (CC) such as the meeting competition clause (MCC) and the beating competition clauses (BCC) in a general framework. In contrast to previous theoretical studies, we allow for repeated interaction among the retailers and heterogeneity in their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012546930

The Collusive Efficacy of Competition Clauses in Bertrand Markets with Capacity-Constrained Retailers

Trost, Michael Markus - 2021

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013223424

Violation behavior in vertical restraint : empirical analyses in the case of retail price maintenance

Xiao, Ping; Chen, Xinlei; Chen, Yuxin; Lu, Wei - In: International journal of research in marketing : IJRM ; … 38 (2021) 4, pp. 953-973

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013191816

Cartelization through buyer groups

Doyle, Chris; Han, Martijn A. - 2012

Retailers may enjoy stable cartel rents in their output market through the formation of a buyer group in their input market. A buyer group allows retailers to credibly commit to increased input prices, which serve to reduce combined final output to the monopoly level; increased input costs are...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009631585

Manufacturer cartels and resale price maintenance

Hunold, Matthias; Muthers, Johannes - 2020

We provide a theory of how RPM facilitate upstream cartels absent any information asymmetries using a model with … manufacturers if they collude. We thus provide a novel theory of harm for resale price maintenance when manufacturers collude and … illustrate the fit of this theory in various competition policy cases. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012438202

Multi-product bargaining, bundling, and buyer power

Dertwinkel-Kalt, Markus; Wey, Christian - In: Economics letters 188 (2020), pp. 1-5

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012227817

Collusion or not : the optimal choice of competing retailers in a closed-loop supply chain

Wang, Qifei; Hong, Xianpei; Gong, Yeming; Chen, Wanying - In: International journal of production economics 225 (2020), pp. 1-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012293797

Do MSRPs decrease prices?

De los Santos, Babur; Kim, In Kyung; Lubensky, Dmitry - In: International journal of industrial organization 59 (2018), pp. 429-457

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012103355

Search and equilibrium prices : theory and evidence from retail diesel

Cabral, Luís M. B.; Schober, Dominik; Woll, Oliver - 2019 - This version: March 27, 2019

We examine the relation between consumer search and equilibrium prices when collusion is endogenously determined. We develop a theoretical model and show that average price is a U-shaped function of the measure of searchers: prices are highest when there are no searchers (local monopoly power)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012007152