This paper draws the attention to some simple formulas to calculate equilibrium prices in case a linear demand is reasonable and information about the choke price is available. It can serve to convince analysts that even with very limited data and no algebra, powerful back of the envelope...

The focus of this paper is on the consequences of asymmetric spillovers on the strategic investments in an oligopoly with leaders and followers. Both in the investment and output game, leaders move before the followers. Spillovers may occur between leaders and between followers and from leaders...

In innovative races with winner takes all, leading firms invest less than each follower, given exogenous entry (Reinganum, 1985). But with endogenous entry this result is reversed (Etro, 2004). It is argued here that sharing of rewards between the players may alter these predictions

This paper analyzes the strategic incentives of first and second movers in sequential investment games with Stackelberg competition and price leadership on the output market. The study shows that the follower can invest more than the leader when the outgoing spillover from the leader to the...

The literature on unionized oligopoly has demonstrated that unions will generally benefit from cooperation. Despite these benefits, most initiatives towards Europeanization of collective bargaining have been unsuccessful. Some notable exceptions can be found in the European metal industry. The...