This paper studies the stability of price competition in a horizontally differentiated duopoly. The firms' demand is derived from a distribution of consumer preferences. This description of the consumer sector is applicable to a large class of differentiated commodity markets, including spatial...

This paper extends the revelation principle to environments in which the mechanism designer cannot fully commit to the outcome induced by the mechanism. We show that he may optimally use a direct mechanism under which truthful revelation is an optimal strategy for the agent. In contrast with the...

I present the idea that imperfect information about the (vertical) quality characteristics of goods reduces the sellers' incentives for horizontal product differentiation. As a result, the equilibrium outcome may be characterized by "minimum differentiation." In a spatial framework this implies...

We examine the commitment effect of delegated bargaining when the delegation contract is renegotiable. We consider a seller who can either bargain face-to-face with a prospective buyer or delegate bargaining to an intermediary. The intermediary is able to interrupt negotiating with the buyer to...

Bargaining between a single seller and a succession of potential bu yers of an indivisible object is studied in this paper. The seller bargains with one buyer at a time and switching buyers is costly. The seller does not know the buyers' reservation prices and buyers cannot observe the quality...