This paper shows that governments have no incentive to introduce non-tariff barriers when they are free to set tariffs but they do when tariffs are determined cooperatively. We then show three results. First, with trade liberalization, there is a progression from u sing tariffs only to quotas,...

This paper investigates the contractual choice between exclusive dealing and common agency in a simple international oligopoly model where products are sold through intermediaries. We find that when trade barriers are high domestic firms tend to adopt exclusive dealing contracts, whereas trade...

Moving from market segmentation to market integration (firms cannot discriminate among markets) is shown to have often anticompetitive effects in an infinitely repeated Cournot game. In particular, market integration between two countries leads both of them to experience anticompetitive effects...

We examine the interaction between commodity taxes and parallel imports in a simple two-country model with imperfect competition. While governments determine non-cooperatively their commodity tax rate, the volume of parallel imports is determined endogenously by the retailing sector. We compare...

The authors argue that the rationalization gains often predicted by static applied general equilibrium models with imperfect competition and scale economies are artificially boosted by an unrealistic treatment of fixed costs. They introduce sunk costs into one such model calibrated with...

Using the Hotelling approach to product differentiation, this article derives the equilibrium product configurations and prices when two firms enter and sell in two interdependent markets separated by barriers to trade. It shows that product imitation and no trade as well as product...

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This paper considers the allocation of two types of individuals differentiated by levels of talent within and between two countries when they choose to be workers or entrepreneurs. The equilibrium with international migrations requires both countries to be sufficiently different in talent...