Similar Search Results

Narrow search

Policy biases when the monetary and fiscal authorities have different objectives

Bennett, Herman; Loayza, Norman - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001533246

Revisiting the case for a populist central banker

Lippi, Francesco - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001542205

Dynamic games of fiscal and monetary policies for Austria

Neck, Reinhard - 1996 - Rev. version

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001471218

Voting, bargaining and strategic delegation : theory and applications to European Central Bank policies

Brückner, Matthias - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001472574

Monetary and fiscal policy design under EMU: a dynamic game approach

Aarle, Bas van (contributor) - 2000

This paper analyses the problem of designing macroeconomic stabilization policies within the European Monetary Union (EMU) as a dynamic game between a centralized monetary authority, the European Central Bank (ECB), and national fiscal policy makers. Non-cooperative feedback Nash equilibrium and...