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determination of government debt and deficits in a dynamic political economy model. We show that this conventional wisdom relies on … uncertainty, then a rent-seeking government actually over-saves and over-taxes along the equilibrium path relative to a benevolent … government. This result emerges because of the option value of rent-seeking: A rent-seeking government over-values future funds …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013119168
Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121590
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013126183
Attempting to shed light on the optimal size of government, economists have analyzed planning problems that specify a … choice of a planner who knows the welfare achieved by each policy. This paper examines choice of size of government by a … a wide range of spending levels--thus, a society can rationalize having a small or large government. I conclude that to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013104080
We analyze whether or not the globalization of capital, ‘disciplines' governments and improves governance. We demonstrate that globalization affects governance, by increasing a country's vulnerability to sudden capital flight. This increased threat of capital flight can discipline governments...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013091699
This paper offers a new interpretation of the connection between openness and good governance. Assuming that corruption and bad governance drive out international trade and investment more than domestic trade and investment, a naturally more open economy' as determined by its size and geography...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012470985
We study the constrained Pareto efficient allocations in a dynamic production economy in which the group that holds political power decides the allocation of resources. We show that Pareto efficient allocations take a quasi-Markovian structure and can be represented recursively as a function of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150732
We discuss political economy mechanisms which can explain the resource curse, in which an increase in the size of resource rents causes a decrease in the economy's; total value added. We identify a number of channels through which resource rents will alter the incentives of a political leader....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150881
government, which – by virtue of their periodic accountability to the electorate – are collectively referred to as the ‘political …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833483
Why do inefficient - non-growth enhancing - institutions emerge and persist? This paper develops a simple framework to provide some answers to this question. Political institutions determine the allocation of political power, and economic institutions determine the framework for policy-making...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012734829