We consider a principal-agent model where the agent is a taxpayer and the principal is a tax authority. The principal wants to know the agent’s private information (e.g. emission or income) so that she can then assign a tax to the agent. It is mandatory for the taxpayer to report his...

This paper derives the optimal financial contract when a borrowing entrepreneur can evade taxes in a model of costly state verification. In contrast to previous literature on costly state verification and financial contracting, we find that standard debt contracts are not optimal when tax...

We propose a model that captures tax avoidance as an investment under uncertainty: searching for tax loopholes or developing legal avoidance schemes is associated with costs; the tax benefit is however uncertain. Its height depends on whether or not the tax agency agrees with the chosen...

This study investigates the contagious nature of tax avoidance by examining how narratives affect tax avoiding behavior. We adapt the idea of narrative economics indicating that individuals' actions are stimulated by stories that spread within a society. We employ two types of infection models...

There are two ways for taxpayers to avoid paying taxes: legally, through tax optimization and illegally, through tax evasion. The government reacts by altering the law, and by conducting audits, respectively. These phenomena are modeled as a population game, a strategic interaction between all...