It is widely believed that an environmental tax (price regulation) and cap-and-trade (quantity regulation) are equally efficient in controlling pollution when there is no uncertainty. We show that this is not the case if some consumers (firms, local governments) are morally concerned about...

The use of price instruments is often advocated by economists, based on their ability to bring about marginal abatement cost equalisation, and hence to achieve targets at least cost. We use the EU ETS as a case study and test this theoretical prediction. We parametrically estimate separate...

International carbon markets are frequently propagated as an efficient instrument for reducing CO2 emissions. We argue that such markets, despite their desirable efficiency properties, might not be in the best interest of governments who are guided by strategic considerations in negotiations. We...

New York is considering additional emission regulation on top of its obligations under the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) to achieve its State Energy Plan targets. The proposed measure is a so-called "carbon adder" on CO2 emissions from the power sector which is set as the difference...

For any emission trading system (ETS) with quantity-based endogenous supply of allowances, there exists a negative demand shock, e.g. induced by abatement policy, that increases aggregate supply and thus cumulative emissions. We prove this green paradox for a general model and then apply it to...

The EU emissions trading system (ETS) and the promotion of renewable energy are overlapping regulations. Although the resulting early development of renewables is associated with several advantages such an overlap may violate the path of optimal abatement. Subsidies may cause a too high share of...