We study cooperative games with communication structure, represented by an undirected graph. Players in the game are able to cooperate only if they can form a network in the graph. A single-valued solution, the average tree solution, is proposed for this class of games. Given the graph structure...

We study the existence problem of a zero point of a function defined on a finite set of elements of the integer lattice of the n-dimensional Euclidean space. It is assumed that the set is integrally convex, which implies that the convex hull of the set can be subdivided in simplices such that...

In this paper we generalize the concept of coalitional games by allowing for any organizational structure within coalitions represented by a graphon the set of players ot the coalition. A, possibly empty, set of payoffvectors is assigned to any graph on every subset of players. Such a game will...

We consider cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), in which we allow for a social structure on the set of players. The social structure is utilized to refine the core of the game. For every coalition the relative strength of a player within that coalition is induced by the...

Any function from a non-empty polytope into itself that is locally gross direction preserving is shown to have the fixed point property. Brouwer's fixed point theorem for continuous functions is a special case. We discuss the application of the result in the area of non-cooperative game theory.

In this paper an algorithm is proposed to find an integral solution of (nonlinear) complementarity problems. The algorithm starts with a nonnegative integral point and generates a unique sequence of adjacent integral simplices of varying dimension. Conditions are stated under which the algorithm...