We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on...

The question of an optimal licensing contract in a leadership structure is studied when the patent holder is a non-producer and has three alternative licensing strategies, namely fixed fee, royalty and auction. Assuming once-for-all licensing contracts, we show that royalty dominates other modes...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to study the question of pre-emptive merger decisions in a composite good framework where these goods have both competitive and complementary features. Design/methodology/approach – The paper constructs a model of partial mergers when there are three...

We consider a joint venture between a local firm from a less developed country, and a foreign multinational. In a dynamic two period model, we demonstrate that the availability of new technology can trigger a joint venture breakdown, a result that is consistent with the empirical evidence. We...

Under certain conditions it is optimal for the noninnovating south to give patent protection for a longer time period than the innovating north. A cooperative patent agreement involves a larger protection by each country compared to the non-cooperative situation. [WP 9].

We consider the possibility of forming a joint venture (JV) between a local firm and a foreign multinational in a situation when there is no current gain from such an arrangement. In the presence of policy uncertainty and threat of entry, a current period formation of JV with the multinational,...

In an oligopoly industry of k firms (k 2) with linear demand and identical (constant) average cost of production, a bilateral merger is never profitable when all firms choose their quantities simultaneously. In this paper we reexamine the issue when some firms have first-mover advantage. We...