The analysis provides insights regarding the suitability of offensive versus defensive measures in countering a terror cell. It is shown that the optimal allocation is more offensive when the cell is aware of which targets have been protected, but unable to distinguish between the values of...

The present paper provides a brief survey of some of the papers dealing with R&D uncertainty. This helps us identify which factors are more favorable for cooperative R&D and which factors are not. The paper provides the analysis under a unified framework. We take the classic paper by Marjit...

We consider interaction of two terror outfits and study possible counter-terrorism (CT) measures, both in the absence and presence of external terror finance. In our paper, external sponsorship with proportional allocation rule, induces strategic interaction and incentivizes more attacks. We...

A firm’s decision to invest in R&D depends on a number of factors like availability of funds, extent of R&D spillovers, market structure, and success probability. However, probability of success depends, to a large extent, on factors endogenous to a firm. This means, success probability can be...

The paper shows that in the absence of external sponsorship, strategic cooperation between two outfits has no impact on terror activity, if neither outfit is resource-constrained a priori. If only one outfit is resource-constrained a priori, inter-group cooperation increases terror activity if...

R&D decision of a firm involves various sources of incomplete information. The present paper introduces incomplete information about the success probability of R&D in a model of two firms interacting in R&D and production and discusses the choice between cooperative and non-cooperative research....

The paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research under incomplete information when the R&D outcome is stochastic and continuously distributed with a given mean and a constant variance. We show that the non-cooperative R&D incentive increases with the...

In a Cournot duopoly with one foreign firm and one domestic firm we show that a tariff on foreign products can be an effective instrument to influence the licensing strategy of the foreign firm. Under free trade technology transfer occurs with a royalty contract, but a suitably designed tariff...

This paper studies incentives for cooperative research vis-à-vis non-cooperative research in an incomplete information framework. We show that with quantity competition under asymmetric information, the expected payoff from non-cooperative research goes down compared to the case of symmetric...

We construct a model to show that outsourcing of a crucial input can occur even though it can be produced in-house at a lower cost. There are two firms producing differentiated goods and competing in prices, and only one of them possesses input production technology which is superior to that of...