We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the...

The standard contest model in which participants compete in a single dimension is well understood and documented. Multi-dimension extensions are possible but are liable to increase the complexity of the contest structure, mitigating one of its main advantages: simplicity. In this paper we...

Where product innovation requires several complementary patents, fragmented property rights can limit firms' willingness to invest in R&D. We consider the research intensity in multiple simultaneous R & D contests and how it depends on whether firms already hold relevant patents as well as the...

The authors study conflict on multiple fronts. A defending player needs to successfully defend all fronts, and an attacker needs to win at only one. Multiple fronts result in a considerable disadvantage for the defending player, and even if there is a defense advantage at each of them, the...

This paper analyses competition between transport firms that have goals that extend beyond traditional profit maximisation. Specifically, operators maximise a weighted combination of profits and consumer surplus. We calculate equilibrium solutions for the case of symmetric firms producing...

We investigate a multi-period contest model in which a contestant.s present success gives an advantage over a rival in the future. How this win advantage affects contestants.efforts, and whether the laggard gives up or keep on fighting are key issues. We find that the expected effort of the...

This paper analyses the endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although each firm determines its R&D investment level non-cooperatively and there is no co-operation in the product market. We...

This paper analyses endogenous formation of technology sharing coalitions with asymmetric firms. Coalition partners produce complementary technology advancements, although firms do not co-operate on R&D investment level or in the product market. The equilibrium coalition outcome is either...

In this paper we look at motivation over time by setting up a dynamic contest model where winning the first contest yields an advantage in the second contest. The win advantage introduces an asymmetry into the competition that we find reduces the expected value to the contestants of being in the...