Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU,...

We use cooperative game theory to analyze the impact of three controversial pipeline projects on the power structure in the Eurasian trade of natural gas. Two of them, Nord Stream and South Stream, allow Russian gas to bypass transit countries, Ukraine and Belarus. Nord Stream’s strategic...

For a long time European gas markets used to be dominated by `national champions', vertically integrated firms, controlling imports, transit lines and distribution networks. In its drive to create a common market, the EU commission is trying to overcome this fragmentation by liberalizing...

In most cases rent control covers only a part of the housing stock. This note provides a simple analysis of the impact which rent control and non-price rationing exert on the rent in the free sector. It is shown that, depending on the rationing mechanism, rents in the free sector can be higher...

The realization of international energy distribution networks requires cooperation and the sharing of costs and benefits. Economic incentives, at a country level, to join an international network depend on how net surplus would be distributed, which in turn depends on a variety of factors:...

This paper illustrates a methodology for analyzing bargaining games on network markets, by means of numerical models that can be calibrated with real data. Economic incentives to join or to expand a network depend on how the network surplus is being distributed, which in turn depends on a...