This article merges two areas of strategic pricing theory. A dynamic signalling game with two-sided uncertainty is presented in which an incumbent is confronted with potential entry and chooses between limit pricing and predatory pricing as a means of achieving or maintaining monopoly profit....

This paper investigates informative price advertising in an established-product Hotelling duopoly where firms compete for shares of a fixed market. Prices are uncertain because firms' costs are private information. For a sufficiently low cost of advertising, advertising necessarily arises in...

Statistical discrimination contracts screen employees based on gender or race. Because the theory entails profit maximization, it represented an improvement over taste-based theories of discrimination. Truly profit-maximizing firms may be able to improve on these contracts, however, by offering...

An entrepreneur wishes to communicate private information to investors to secure a desirable financial contract. The entrepreneur can signal project type through its choice of capital structure or can directly reveal sufficient information so that its type is known. Information directly revealed...

This paper examines optimal income maintenance policy with asymmetric information about individuals' abilities. A minimum skill level is required for employment. The unemployable are those (low) ability types who find this minimum investment too costly. To guarantee some minimum income level,...