Recent experimental results show that equilibrium selection in coordination games exhibits remarkable regularities. In the paper we analyze three important determinants for equilibrium selection, the size of the population of players, the number of periods during which players interact, and the...

Subjects repeatedly played a three-player coordination game with a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Subjects interacting in fixed groups quickly coordinated on the payoff-dominant equilibrium, while those interacting with their neighbours around a circle eventually coordinated on...

We examine the behavior of subjects in a simple principal-agent game with hidden action. While subjects in the role of agents tend to choose the actions which maximize their expected profits, subjects in the role of principals offer contracts which differ from the theoretical predictions. We...

We examine a technology-adoption game with network effects in which coordination on either technology A or technology B constitutes a Nash equilibrium. Coordination on technology B is assumed to be payoff dominant. We define a technology’s critical mass as the minimal share of users, which is...

[fre] Les expériences qui ont testé les prédictions du modèle principal-agent, ont révélé que la plupart des contrats offerts ne respectaient pas la contrainte d'incitation, à la fois dans les situations où l'interaction entre un principal et un agent est répétée pendant plusieurs...

Contracts may be subject to strategic default, particularly if public enforcement institutions are weak. In a lab experiment, we study behavior in a contract farming game without third-party enforcement but with an external spot market as outside option. Two players, farmer and company, may...

In a public-good experiment with heterogeneous endowments, we investigate if and how the contribution level as well as the previously observed fair-share rule of equal contributions relative to one's endowment (Hofmeyr et al., 2007; Keser et al., 2014) may be influenced by minimum-contribution...

We investigate the formation of market prices in a new experimental setting involving multi-period call-auction asset markets with state-dependent fundamentals. We are particularly interested in two informational aspects: (1) the role of traders who are informed about the true state and/or (2)...

The objective of this paper is to look into the probability that, given the choice, corporate groups would opt for taxation on a consolidated basis. Consolidation would allow them to offset losses crossborder but remove the opportunity to exploit international tax-rate differentials between...

In this paper, we investigate in a controlled laboratory experiment physician behavior in the case of payment heterogeneity. In the experiment, each physician provides medical care to patients whose treatments are paid for either under fee-for-service (FFS) or capitation (CAP). We observe that...