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Atomic dynamic flow games : adaptive vs. nonadaptive agents

Cao, Zhigang; Chen, Bo; Chen, Xujin; Wang, Changjun - In: Operations research 69 (2021) 6, pp. 1680-1695

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012815684

Strong robustness to incomplete information and the uniqueness of a correlated equilibrium

Einy, Ezra; Haimanko, Ori; Lagziel, David - In: Economic theory 73 (2022) 1, pp. 91-119

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012818316

Existence of equilibria in constrained discontinuous games

Bagh, Adib - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 45 (2016) 4, pp. 769-793

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011635101

Pareto-undominated and socially-maximal equilibria in non-atomic games

Fu, Haifeng; Yu, Haomiao - In: Journal of mathematical economics 58 (2015), pp. 7-15

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011573322

Existence of Equilibria in Constrained Discontinuous Games

Bagh, Adib - 2019

We establish the existence of pure strategy equilibria in games with discontinuous payoffs where the set of feasible actions of each player varies, also in a discontinuous fashion, as a function of the actions of the other players. Such games are used in modeling abstract economies and other...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012905077

Is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium a Subset of Nash Equilibrium?

Teng, Jimmy - 2013

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is not a subset of Nash equilibrium. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium requires players to have beliefs that are consistent with the equilibrium strategies of other players. Nash equilibrium does not explicitly specify the beliefs of the players. However, the default...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014158965

A Note on the Nash Equilibrium in Winner-take-all Bertrand Game

Li, Xinmi; Zheng, Jie - 2022

In this paper, we fully characterize the Nash Equilibrium in the winner-take-all Bertrand Game, showing that a mixed strategy profile is a Nash Equilibrium, if and only if it is a zero operating profit one, and there exist at least two players whose bids are all unprofitable. Compared with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014080623

Chapter 44 Non-zero-sum two-person games

Raghavan, T.E.S. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1687-1721). 2002

This chapter is devoted to the study of Nash equilibria, and correlated equilibria in both finite and infinite games. We restrict our discussions to only those properties that are somewhat special to the case of two-person games. Many of these properties fail to extend even to three-person...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024501

Chapter 42 Foundations of strategic equilibrium

Hillas, John; Kohlberg, Elon - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1597-1663). 2002

This chapter examines the conceptual foundations of the concept of strategic equilibrium and its various variants and refinements. The emphasis is very much on the underlying ideas rather than on any technical details.After an examination of some pre-equilibrium ideas, in particular the concept...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024503

Chapter 41 Strategic equilibrium

Van Damme, Eric - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1521-1596). 2002

This chapter of the Handbook of Game Theory (Vol. 3) provides an overview of the theory of Nash equilibrium and its …-enforcing theory of rational behavior in non-cooperative games. Given the assumption of independent behavior of the players, it follows … that a self-enforcing theory has to prescribe a Nash equilibrium, i.e., a strategy profile such that no player can gain by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024504