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Moral Hazard Problems in Fisheries Regulation: The Case og Illegal Landings

Jensen, Frank; Vestergaard, Niels - 2000

This paper treats illegal landings as a moral hazard problem that arises, since individual catches are unobservable to society and hence private information. A tax/subsidy mechanism taking into account the asymmetric information problem is formulated as a solution to problems with illegal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321939

Robustness of Sharing Rules under Climate Change - The Case of International Fisheries Agreements

Brandt, Urs Steiner; Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk - 2006

Many international fisheries agreements involve sharing rules. The current pa-per analysis the stability of sharing rules when coping with long run changes in the composition of fish stocks in an international setting due to climate change. The exploitation of the cod stock in the Baltic Sea...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321945

Fishery Economics and Game Theory

Grønbæk, Lone - 2000

Game theory is an analytical tool for modeling strategic interaction between agents. Strategic interaction in fishery … study on the fishery economics and game theory. It tends to describe how fishery models using game theory are build up … describes different types of fishery and how these types are related to game theory. Special features as externalities and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321949

An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities forming Coalitions

Kronbak, Lone Grønbæk; Lindroos, Marko - 2003

The paper sets up a four-stage enforcement model of fish quotas. The purpose of the paper is to show how the level of enforcement set by the authorities af-fects the way fishermen form coalitions. We show that a high level of control effort yields less cooperation among fishermen, while in the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321953

The Effect of Climate Change on the Probability of Conservation: Fisheries Regulation as a Policy Contest

Brandt, Urs Steiner - 2006

This paper considers the policy outcome of a contest between two opposing in-terest groups: the incumbent fishermen and a group of conservationalists. The objective of the fishermen is to maximize profit, and they are (partly) concerned over future profitability as well, while the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321964

Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Contracting

Brandt, Urs Steiner; Jensen, Frank; Hansen, Lars Gårn; … - 2004

Real life implies that public procurement contracting of renewable resources results in repeated interaction between a principal and the agents. The present paper analyses ratchet effects in contracting of renewable resources and how the presence of a resource constraint alters the "standard"...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010321970

Generelle Nichtdiskontierung als Bedingung für eine nachhaltige Entwicklung?

Bayer, Stefan - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322039

Die Baulandausweisungsumlage als ökonomisches Steuerungsinstrument einer nachhaltigkeitsorientierten Flächenpolitik

Krumm, Raimund - 2002

In Zusammenhang mit der Diskussion um eine nachhaltige Entwicklung in Deutschland werden ökonomische Steuerungsinstrumente erörtert, deren Einsatz auf eine Begrenzung des durch kommunale Baugebietsausweisungen induzierten "Flächenverbrauchs" abzielt. Vor diesem Hintergrund wird in dem...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322040

Randomized Response and the Binary Probit Model

Ronning, Gerd - 2003

The paper analyzes effects of randomized response with respect to some binary dependent variable on the estimation of the probit model. This approach is used in interviews when asking sensitive questions. Alternatively randomization can be considered as a means of statistical disclosure control...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322046

Stability, chaos and multiple attractors: A single agent makes a difference

Onozaki, Tamotsu; Sieg, Gernot; Yokoo, Masanori - 2001

This paper provides an example in which a slight behavioral heterogeneity may fundamentally change the qualitative properties of a nonlinear cobweb market with a quadratic cost function and an isoelastic demand function. We consider two types of producers; adaptive and naive. In a market of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010322049