We present a model in which the embezzlement of tax revenues by public officials leads the government to rely more on seigniorage to finance its expenditures. This raises inflation which depresses investment and growth via a cash-in-advance constraint.

We study the relationship between the underground economy and financial development in a model of tax evasion and bank intermediation. Agents with heterogeneous skills seek loans in order to undertake risky investment projects. Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders implies a menu...

This paper presents an analysis of the effect of bureaucratic corruption on economic growth through a public finance transmission channel. At the theoretical level, we develop a simple dynamic general equilibrium model in which financial intermediaries make portfolio decisions on behalf of...

We study the eþect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy...

This paper presents an analysis of bureaucratic corruption, income inequality and economic development. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which bureaucrats are appointed by the government to implement a redistributive programme of taxes and subsidies designed to...

We study the effect of international financial integration on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. Our analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model of a small economy in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy...

We present an analysis of the effects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by...