We study the effects of red tape and corruption in a model of occupational choice, entry regulation and imperfect capital markets. Red tape is the set of rules and regulations that private agents are obliged to comply with in order to engage in entrepreneurial activity. Corruption is the payment...

We consider an artificial world of two interdependent economies which produce differentiated commodities and accumulate human capital. Commodities are traded and human capital production depends on country-specific public expenditures and world-wide knowledge. Public goods are differentiated in...

This paper presents a dynamic general equilibrium analysis of public sector corruption and economic growth. In an economy with government intervention and capital accumulation, state-appointed bureaucrats are charged with the responsibility for procuring public goods which contribute to...

We develop and apply a method of testing for speculative bubbles. The method is designed to overcome two well-known problems in the identification of bubble phenomena--the problem of distinguishing any type of bubble from an expected future change in market fundamentals and the problem of...

We present a model in which the embezzlement of tax revenues by public officials leads the government to rely more on seigniorage to finance its expenditures. This raises inflation which depresses investment and growth via a cash-in-advance constraint.

We study the relationship between the underground economy and financial development in a model of tax evasion and bank intermediation. Agents with heterogeneous skills seek loans in order to undertake risky investment projects. Asymmetric information between borrowers and lenders implies a menu...

We present an analysis of the e¤ects of foreign aid on economic development when the quality of governance may be compromised by corruption. The analysis is based on a dynamic general equilibrium model in which growth is driven by capital accumulation and public policy is administered by...