We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

We analyse a non-zero sum two-person game introduced by Teraoka and Yamada to model the strategic aspects of production development in manufacturing. In particular we investigate how sensitive their solution concept (Nash equilibrium) is to small variations in their assumptions. It is proved...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

The division of a cake by two players is modelled by means of a game of timing in which the players have a probability of learning when their opponent acts. It is shown that the game has a unique Nash equilibrium when both players are non-noisy but that there are many Nash equilibria including...

An infiltrator tries to go through a graph of n arcs, within a time limit, without being caught by a guard. The latter is allowed a restricted number of tentatives to catch the infiltrator. This paper describes optimal strategies and gives the value of this discrete zero-sum infiltration game.

An infiltrator tries to go through a graph of n arcs, within a time limit, without being caught by a guard. The latter is allowed a restricted number of tentatives to catch the infiltrator. This paper describes optimal strategies and gives the value of this discrete zero-sum infiltration game