This paper develops a model that explains the persistence of excess demand for some goods. It offers that, for some goods, consumers care about who else is consuming the good. As such, their willingness to pay depends on their beliefs about the other consumers. We demonstrate that screening...

This paper studies the finite horizon version of the negotiation model of Busch and Wen (1995). Two players bargain over the division of a certain surplus in finitely many periods. In the absence of an agreement, players¡¯ payoffs in a period are determined by a disagreement game. The set of...

If willingness to pay depends on characteristics of other attendees, a monopolist will use a lineup as a screening mechanism only if a consumer's characteristic is inversely related to her cost of lining up. No capacity constraint is necessary.

An alternating-offers bargaining model in which a normal-form game determines players' payoffs in disagreement periods can have multiple perfect equilibria, provided that players are sufficiently patient. Even though there is perfect information, delay can arise and the length of delay depends...