The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. We model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity....

Almost all studies of skilled/unskilled employment over the 1980s use data on manuals and non-manuals to measure skill. This paper constructs data on skilled/unskilled employment using occupational data from the UK New Earnings Survey Panel Data set. It merges these data with other product and...

We attempt to replicate for the UK the Corrado, Hulten and Sichel (2005, 2006) work on spending on intangible assets in the US. Their work suggests private sector expenditure (investment) on intangibles is about 13% (11%) of US GDP 1998-2000, with intangible investment about equal to tangible...

The usual analysis of privatization and X-inefficiency uses agency theory to model managerial effort. The authors model worker effort as determined by a bargain between firms and workers. Workers dislike effort because it lowers utility. Firms prefer high effort because it raises productivity....

An enormous number of empirical papers have estimated technical efficiency, the distance of firms inside a frontier, following the model of Farrell (1957). We propose a theory that explains the distance these empirical papers seek to measure. The theory is based on the idea that workers can...

We use a new sample of UK female identical twins to estimate private economic returns to education. We report findings in three areas. First, we use identical twins, to control for family effects and genetic ability bias, and the education reported by the other twin to control for schooling...

Investigates changes in skilled and unskilled employment over the 1980s using UK data skills from the Labour Force Survey and the New Earnings Survey Panel Data set, matched with industrial data from the Census of Production. The major findings are: that there was a rise in on‐manual wage and...