the referrer. The advantage of the lab setting is that we can isolate directed altruism as the only reason for these …

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts …

analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) "coerced altruism," that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets … ,and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …

other. We show that altruism has a non-monotonic effect on effort. We study how this effect depends on "climate," the …

We analyze how the altruism of an international financial institution (IFI) towards its lowincome member countries …. Thus, IFI altruism and the inability to commit are sufficient reasons to equip loans with conditions. Conditional loans … produce an efficient allocation of resources, so altruism is not a fundamental reason that loans fail to increase welfare. …

mixture of true and coerced altruism between family members. We model families as pairs of siblings. Each sibling exerts … actuarially fair formal insurance. We show that coerced family altruism reduces individual efforts in equilibrium. However …, individuals always benefit ex ante from living in families with coerced altruism, as compared with living in autarky. We show that …

analyze how the equilibrium outcome depends on altruism and climate for ex ante identical individuals. We also consider (a …) "coerced altruism," that is, situations where a social norm dictates how output be shared, (b) the effects of insurance markets …, and (c) the role of institutional quality. The evolutionary robustness of altruism is analyzed and we study how this …