Within a Monetary Union, we assume that the policy of a hard-nosed central bank results in a real appreciation of the Union currency, which is in contradiction with the growth targets of several countries. These countries may join together to question the policy of the bank. As a consequence,...

Thanks to the Maastricht Treaty and similar arrangements, central banks nowadays enjoy considerable independence. This is generally believed to be the result of relatively recent debates, which led to the conclusion that sheltering monetary authorities from the pressures of fiscal policymakers...

Monetary policy and institutions are far from exempt from political influences. In this paper, we analyze monetary institutions not as being run by either benevolent technocrats or a wealth maximizing Leviathan but as being the outcome of competition between interest groups trying to capture...

We examine, in a suitable theoretical framework, the relations between monetary and fiscal policies within the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU). Our stylized setup of EMU includes the following political agents, each endowed with an objective function: (i) A central authority (EC),...

This paper challenges the time-inconsistency case for central bank independence. It argues that the time-inconsistency literature not only seriously confuses the substance of the rules versus discretion debate, but also posits an implausible view of monetary policy. Most worrisome, the...