When a principal’s monitoring information is private (non-verifiable), the agent should be concerned that the principal could misrepresent the information to reduce the agent’s wage or collect a monetary penalty. Restoring credibility may lead to an extreme waste of resources - the so-called...

Collusion is an agreement between two or more firms designed to limit competition among the group. This chapter considers the conditions that feasible agreements must satisfy in terms of the fundamental trade-off of increased payoffs from continuing participation and payoffs from ceasing...

In an extended version of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin's (1988) R&D competition model we find a region where the game is a prisoner's dilemma: firms still invest in R&D but they would obtain a higher profit by not investing at all. In a repeated version of the game, we prove that firms implicitly...

A booming literature describes how artificial intelligence algorithms (AIAs) may autonomously learn to generate supra-competitive profits. Key to the widespread interpretation of the phenomena as ``collusion'', is the observation that the unilateral price cuts of an agent are followed by several...

Antitrust compliance scholarship, particularly with a focus on collusion, has been an area of study for some time. Changes in technology and the rise of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine-learning create new possibilities both for anti-competitive behavior and to aid in detection of such...

Expanding on the literature on antitrust, multiple ownership, and collusion in sports, this paper finds a very unusual result pattern between two clubs competing in the Croatian soccer league—Lokomotiva and Dinamo Zagreb. Their close sporting and business relationship has raised many questions...