The crisis of environmental degradation has createcharemd an immense volume of literature which focuses on controlling environmental problems. Economic Rights and Environmental Wrongs goes one step further to extend and complement the current debates

We study how the strength of property rights to individual extractive firms affects a regulator's choice over exploitation rates for a natural resource. The regulator is modeled as an intermediary between current and future resource harvesters, rather than between producers and consumers, as in...

Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the security of these property rights varies substantially owing to differences in design. In fisheries, the design of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies widely; the consequences of...

We develop two models of economic growth with exhaustible natural resources and consumers heterogeneous in time preferences. The first model assumes private ownership of natural resources. In the second model, natural resources are commonly owned and the resource extraction rate is chosen by...

We consider the redistributive effects of privatizing a resource previously exploited under free access. We assume that illegal extraction is punished but that the sanction is bounded by individual's wealth. First, we show that a segment of intermediate-wealth individuals is the most adversely...

pt. 1. Introduction -- pt. 2. Historic wrecks, modern pirates -- pt. 3. Enclosure -- pt. 4. Fisheries economics -- pt. 5. Fisheries regime formation -- pt. 6. Marine mammals -- pt. 7. Coral reefs, marine protected areas, wetlands -- pt. 8. Pollution -- pt. 9. Minerals.