One bargainer from a finite population X, is matched at random with a bargainer from another finite population Y. They simultaneously precommit to "minimal" shares of a unit surplus. Populations differ in their degree of \underline{perseverance}, parameterized by $\lambda \in (0,1)$. If the...

Varying quantities of a single good can be produced using at least two and at most $n$ factors of production. The problem of allocating the surplus among the factors is studied in a dynamic model with adaptive behavior. Representatives for the factors (called players) make wage demands based on...

Abstract: In a society where individuals differ in their valuation of different social policies, when might one consider a given individual as having references that are extreme relative to the others? And how important are such preferences in determining eventual policy? In this paper, we...

The author studies the dual issues of allocation and coalition formation in a model of social learning. For a class of economies which can be expressed in terms of a real valued characteristic function, he first shows that all self-perpetuating allocations realized from a simple bargaining game...

A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its mean value. We call this insider a Boesky Insider when the quality of the received signal is such that the future value of the asset can be predicted with certainty. We show that even an infinitesimal...

In a k-double auction, a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively. Exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask, the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with...