A partially informed expert, A, strategically transmits information to a principal, P. The residual uncertainty faced by the expert effectively causes the bias between P and A to be random, with two consequences. First, by misreporting A is likely to induce a decision choice by P, after the...

A Decision Maker (DM) must choose at discrete moments from a finite set of actions that result in random rewards. The environment is complex in that she finds it impossible to describe the states and is thus prevented from application of standard Bayesian methods. This paper presents an...

This paper introduces granting of quot;exclusive bidding rightsquot;' to a subset buyers as a way of fostering their pre-auction information acquisition. A revenue maximizing monopolist gives N* the socially efficient number of informed buyers, or one more than N* buyers the exclusive right to...

This paper suggests a theory of choice among strategic situations when the rules of play are not properly specified. We take the view that a quot;strategic situationquot; is adequately described by a TU game since it specifies what is feasible for each coalition but is silent on the procedures...

In a k-double auction, a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively. Exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask, the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with...