A dominant, net buyer of a certain asset receives a private signal that is correlated with its mean value. We call this insider a Boesky Insider when the quality of the received signal is such that the future value of the asset can be predicted with certainty. We show that even an infinitesimal...

In a k-double auction, a buyer and a seller must simultaneously announce a bid and an ask price respectively. Exchange of the indivisible good takes place if and only if the bid is at least as high as the ask, the trading price being the bid price with probability k and the ask price with...

type="main" <p>A sender-receiver game a la Crawford-Sobel is analyzed where the sender has expertise on some but not all the payoff-relevant factors. This residual uncertainty can either improve (even allow full revelation) or worsen the quality of transmitted information depending on a statistic...</p>

One bargainer from a finite population X, is matched at random with a bargainer from another finite population Y. They simultaneously precommit to "minimal" shares of a unit surplus. Populations differ in their degree of \underline{perseverance}, parameterized by $\lambda \in (0,1)$. If the...

Varying quantities of a single good can be produced using at least two and at most $n$ factors of production. The problem of allocating the surplus among the factors is studied in a dynamic model with adaptive behavior. Representatives for the factors (called players) make wage demands based on...