This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit...

This paper measures the welfare gains of switching from inflation-targeting to price-level targeting under imperfect credibility. Vestin (2006) shows that when the monetary authority cannot commit to future policy, price-level targeting yields higher welfare than inflation targeting. We revisit...

Given regime switches in the economy's growth rate, optimal monetary policy rules may respond by switching policy parameters. These optimized parameters differ across regimes and from the optimal choice under fixed regimes, particularly in the inflation target and interest rate inertia. Optimal...

This paper examines how price setting plays a key role in explaining the steady-state effects of inflation in a monopolistic competition economy. Three pricing variants (optimal prices, indexed prices, and unchanged prices) are introduced through a generalization of the Calvo-type setting that...

This article analyses the welfare consequences of delegating to the central bank the task of minimising deviations of forecasts of goal variables from their target values. The delegated objectives considered in this article are motivated by the observation that central banks oftentimes operate...