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In classical perfect and complete markets, prices form a Martingale and stock returns (or equivalently, successive price changes) are serially uncorrelated. However, there is considerable evidence in the finance literature showing that stock returns are serially correlated both in the short and...
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In this study, we examine how banks' stock price crash risk is affected by recourse uncertainty embedded in securitizations. By recourse uncertainty, we mean the difficulty for equity market participants to assess the true extent of risk transfer between securitizing banks and investors in...
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We consider whether the market conditions its reactions to an executive's move from an Origin Company to a Destination Company on the executive's past performance and any other information impounded in the market reaction to the executive's emigration from the Origin Company. We also examine...
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In this paper, we assess the degree to which ERCs reported in the literature may be attenuated due to measurement errors in the proxies for the earnings expected by the market. We use the cross-sectional dispersion of analyst forecasts as a variable to calibrate the measurement error inherent in...
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On December 16, 2004, the Financial Accounting Standards Board published FASB Statement No. 123 (revised 2004), which significantly changes the accounting for employee stock options. Under the new standard, equity-based compensation results in a cost to the issuing enterprise and should be...
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Consider the following puzzle: If earnings management is harmful to shareholders, why don't they design contracts that induce managers to reveal the truth? To answer this question, we model the shareholders-manager relationship as a principal-agent game in which the agent (the manager) alone...
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