Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 1,231,434
Cover Image
Institutional framework of central bank independence: revisited
Lewkowicz, Jacek; Woźniak, Michał; Wrzesiński, Michał - 2021
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012795137
Cover Image
Wirtschaftspolitik
Conrad, Christian A. - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012228621
Cover Image
Populism, economic policies and central banking
Agur, Itai; Gnan, Ernest; Masciandaro, Donato; Binder, … - Populism, Economic Policies and Central Banking …; … - 2020
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012225066
Cover Image
Central bank independence and the legacy of the German past
Mee, Simon - 2019
central bank independence is reminiscent of the fiery debates amongst Germany's political elites in 1949 on the same issue …; debates that were sparked by the establishment of West Germany in that year. Simon Mee shows how, with the establishment of … West Germany's central bank - today's Deutsche Bundesbank - the country's monetary history became a political football, as …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012004948
Cover Image
Federal monetary policy
Hefeker, Carsten - 2001
What is the optimal institutional structure for an independent central bank? The paper shows when it will be optimal for a country to have a central bank to be organized according to federal, purely national or a combination of both aspects. The analysis is then extended to a supranational...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011398004
Cover Image
Federal monetary policy : a comment
Hauck, Achim; Vollmer, Uwe - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 110 (2008) 1, pp. 223-227
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730496
Cover Image
Response to "Federal monetary policy : a comment"
Hefeker, Carsten - In: The Scandinavian journal of economics 110 (2008) 1, pp. 229-230
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003730498
Cover Image
What determines debt intolerance? : the role of political and monetary institutions
Giordano, Raffaela; Tommasino, Pietro - In: European journal of political economy 27 (2011) 3, pp. 471-484
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009260002
Cover Image
Constitutions and central-bank independence : an objection to "McCallum's second fallacy"
Giordani, Paolo (contributor);  … - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource], This version: March 14, 2001
Most of the literature on monetary policy delegation assumes that the government can credibly commit to the delegation contract, an assumption criticized by McCallum. This paper provides foundations for the assumption that renegotiating a delegation contract can be costly by illustrating how...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001600048
Cover Image
Constitutions and central-bank independence : an objection to McCallum's second fallacy
Giordani, Paolo - In: Essays in monetary economics and applied econometrics, (pp. 117-143). 2001
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001635504