We study Nash implementation by natural price-quantity mechanisms in pure exchange economies with free-disposal (Saijo et al., 1996, 1999) when agents have weak/strong intrinsic preferences for honesty (Dutta and Sen, 2012). First, the Walrasian rule is shown to be non-implementable when all...

Under a linear approximation, a standard two-country business cycles model with incomplete markets delivers consumption and debt dynamics that are non-stationary (unit root) and a bond price that is independent of the wealth distribution. We argue that these two features are due to the local...

We build a macroeconomic model that centers on liquidity transformation in the financial sector. Intermediaries maximize liquidity creation by issuing securities that are money-like in normal times but become illiquid in a crash when collateral is scarce. We call this process shadow banking. A...

This paper analyzes the qualitative properties of a multisectoral, multiregional computable general equilibrium model where some industries include heterogeneous firms as in Melitz (2003). The model, formulated according to Roson, R. and Oyamada (2014), adds endogenous productivity effects to a...

We characterize the profit-maximizing mechanism for repeatedly selling a non-durable good in continuous time. The valuation of each agent is private information and changes over time. At the time of contracting every agent privately observes his initial type which influences the evolution of his...

The learning group in Regional Economics works in a similar way as the Balint medical group. During a session, a “problem” is presented by a group member, in the context of a rotation or “turn taking”. The other members do not try to ”solve the problem” by adding technical...

This paper experimentally investigates the nature of impulses in impulse learning. Particularly, we analyze whether positive feedback (i.e., yielding a superior payo in a game) or negative feedback (i.e., yielding an inferior payo in a game) leads to a systematic change in the individual...

In this paper we show that, in the presence of buyer and seller power, a monopolist can enter into a costly contractual relationship with a low-quality supplier with the sole intention of improving its bargaining position relative to a high-quality supplier, without ever selling the good...

In the classical literature of innovation-based endogenous growth, the main engine of long run economic growth is firm entry. Nevertheless, when projects are heterogeneous, and good ideas are scarce, a mass-composition trade off is introduced into this link: larger cohorts are characterized by a...