Unemployment insurance agencies may combat moral hazard by punishing refusals to apply to assigned vacancies. However, the possibility to report sick creates an additional moral hazard, since during sickness spells, minimum requirements on search behavior do not apply. This reduces the ex ante...

This paper explores the impacts on an economy of a central bank changing the size and composition of its balance sheet. One of the ways in which such asset purchases could influence prices and demand is via portfolio balance effects. We develop and calibrate a simple OLG model in which...

We study bank supervision by combining a theoretical model that distinguishes supervision from regulation and a novel dataset on work hours of Federal Reserve supervisors. We highlight the trade-offs between the benefits and costs of supervision and use the model to interpret the relationship...

How strong are strategic complementarities in price setting across firms? In this paper, we provide a direct empirical estimate of firms' price responses to changes in prices of their competitors. We develop a general framework and an empirical identification strategy to estimate the...

We explore the term structures of claims to a variety of cash flows: U.S. government bonds (claims to dollars), foreign government bonds (claims to foreign currency), inflation-adjusted bonds (claims to the price index), and equity (claims to future equity indexes or dividends). Average term...

In diesem Beitrag zeigen wir, dass theoretische und technologische Aussagensysteme zweieigenständige Forschungszweige darstellen und damit die Notwendigkeit erwächst, eineeigene Methodologie technologischer Aussagensysteme zu entwerfen. Wir stellen ersteAnsatzpunkte vor, wie eine solche...

We examine the short- and medium-term effects of announcements of changes in anti-crime policies in the distant future (news shocks) and provide a first extension of the analysis to cases where the announced policy changes may not be realized in the end (noise shocks). We further innovate by...

Consider a repeated principal-agent setting with verifiable effort and an extra profit that can materialize only if the agent is talented. The agent is overconfident and updates beliefs using Bayes’ rule. The agent's principal-expected compensation decreases over time until high talent...